Iqbal declares that Sufism is pantheistic because it requires emptiness to be replaced with the fullness of baqā’. I elucidate the pantheism problem by thinking about the differences between the perceptions of emptiness and fullness in Sufism and Buddhism respectively. What would be a Sufi nirvāna? Can the Sufi fanā’ lead to a “sinking into nothingness” similar to the way in which it is required by Buddhism? If God is the source of an authentic and coherent reality, does this not mean that the subject who underwent śūnyatā or fanā’ is no longer living in the real world? As a matter of fact, the world (including the self) is not simply transcended to reach an “unreal” sphere of God; it still exists, it is simply no longer seen through the lens of discursive thinking and dichotomies. There is thus a paradoxical relationship between everyday life and its own negation. The detachment from everyday life is not to create a “full” alternative reality; and the negation of the self is not to create an alternative “full” self. Similar to Abe and Hisamatsu, Sufism speaks of a “return” to the world (dunyā). Rahman states that for Sufis this return “is not a simple return to the pre-fanā’ state.” Fullness (baqā’) is not simply the diversity among things. It is a continuation that includes specific things of the world even as it remains emptiness. There is thus no difference between the full and the empty but only a différance that makes both baqā’ and śūnyatā dynamic. It is adequate to relate the insistence on a reciprocity with Derrida’s philosophy. Derrida’s project is to deconstruct speech as understood by the Western tradition, that is, speech as the fullness of meaning. Speech with its direct (or should we say “pantheistic”?) signifiers symbolizes the kind of fullness that Platonic metaphysics idolizes.