A Critique of the Limited God Thesis in African Philosophy of Religion
摘要
Classical theism holds, among other things, that the perfection of God implies omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. This belief accounts for the unwavering faith of Christians, Muslims, Jews, some adherents of African Traditional Religion (ATR), and all those who hold the traditional theistic view. Recently, some African philosophers of religion like Kwasi Wiredu, Ada Agada, Ademola Kazeem Fayemi, John A. Bewaji, and Jonathan O. Chimakonam have argued that God is a limited being. At the centre of this view is the challenge posed by the persistence and prevalence of evil, natural and moral, in the world. If God were to be unlimited in power, knowledge, and goodness, evil wouldn’t be a threat to His authority because the God who is unlimited in power would overpower every other thing and would not allow evil to prevail. If unlimited in knowledge, God would have fore-knowledge of everything, including the occurrence of evil. If God is unlimited in goodness and love, He would not allow the world to be ravaged by evil. It is logically, inconsistent that an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-loving God would allow suffering in the world that He created. It seems, then, that God may not be all-powerful, all-knowing, or all-good, which ultimately implies that God is limited. The limited-God thesis, if true, would impede the theist’s belief and total faith in God which would lead him to seeking for something greater than God for succour. This chapter critically evaluates the African limited-God thesis in order to enhance the theistic belief in the un-limitedness of God. The chapter is expository, analytic, and evaluative. It argues that God is not limited, contrary to the stance of African limited-God proponents. The chapter defends the thesis that it is human language that is actually inadequate and limited in describing the exact nature of God.