In a recent engagement with my views about the nature of the thing we call God, Jonathan and Amara Esther Chimakonam point out that my resort to a first cause, in reference to my discussions about the nature of God, was quite hasty and hard to justify—purely a leap of faith that was necessitated by convenience. This challenge is strong enough to elicit a response, for if the Chimakonams are right and there are justifiable reasons to consider an infinite regression, then the notion of a God (as a first cause) within the context of African thought, ought to be abandoned. On the other hand, if God must continue to exist as a first cause, then concrete reasons must emerge to justify the existence of that first cause, beyond the convenience of the idea. My response to this challenge is to finally identify the thing we call God in the singular complements that have interacted to form the present state of affairs. Using Ezumezu logicEzumezu logic, I envision these singular complements as both necessarily existent and in a relationship of mutual dependence, depending on context. Finally, I maintain that singular complements suggest a contextually pantheistic notion of reality. It is a contextually pantheistic notion since the universe is made up of varying expressions of the very eternal singular complements that existed as components of the condition of the first cause but yet different from the pristine relational condition (which I call the point of stable interactions) that actually characterizes what we mean by the “first cause”.