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This chapter deals with bi-level hierarchical mean-field-type game problems. The decision-makers act in a sequential order with informational asymmetry. The state dynamics are driven by jump-diffusion-regime switching and Gauss-Volterra processes, which include fractional Brownian motion and multi-fractional Brownian motion. Throughout the entire chapter, we restrict the strategies of the decision-makers to the class of linear-state-and-mean-field feedback strategy set.

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Stackelberg Mean-Field-Type Games

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Tamer Başar,
  • Boualem Djehiche,
  • Hamidou Tembine

摘要

This chapter deals with bi-level hierarchical mean-field-type game problems. The decision-makers act in a sequential order with informational asymmetry. The state dynamics are driven by jump-diffusion-regime switching and Gauss-Volterra processes, which include fractional Brownian motion and multi-fractional Brownian motion. Throughout the entire chapter, we restrict the strategies of the decision-makers to the class of linear-state-and-mean-field feedback strategy set.