Neurophenomenological Perspectives on Artificial Imagination
摘要
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to outline the threads that connect neurophenomenology to the recent ecological-enactive view of imagination, and second, to explore whether these approaches might be useful for the analysis of artificial imagination, in the form of AI creative tools. To this end, the paper is organised as follows. After an Introduction, Sect. “From Neurophenomenology to Ecological Enactivism” discusses Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenology, which combines the analysis of experience with empirical experiments on biological systems. It then shows how these theories reappear in Karl Friston’s mathematical framework of the free energy principle, which provides a unified account of perception, action, and cognition, and in Andy Clark’s ecological-enactive view of imaginative processes. After that, Sect. “Artificial Imagination” of the paper focuses on artificial imagination, by describing how creative AI works. Finally, the paper concludes that the theoretical framework of ecological-enactivism, starting from a phenomenological perspective, can be helpful in analysing the nature of the artificial imagination.