This chapter argues that freedom is also expressed in a fractured form: (1) as normative freedom, that is, freedom as self-determination (with Kant, Sellars and Brandom as its main representatives), and (2) as non-normative freedom, that is, as an increase of the power to act, as opposed to the ‘power to dominate’ (the main representatives here being Spinoza and Deleuze). It is suggested that normative freedom and non-normative freedom are intimately related in that the former is epistemically and practically necessary for achieving the latter, while the latter is the ultimate raison d’ȇtre of the former. Universals play a key role here as immanent regulative ideals that coordinate collective projects. I argue that universals, stripped of their metaphysical connotations, serve as tools of critique and emancipation, projecting ideals of collective welfare and empowerment. In this sense, universals function hyperstitionally, guiding practices beyond existing constraints.