This chapter takes up the challenge of articulating a successor concept for ‘normativity’ that construes the causal efficacy of the latter in a resolutely immanent naturalistic manner—yet without reducing it to mere physicalism. I mobilize Land’s (Fanged noumena: Collected writings 1987–2007. Urbanomic, Falmouth, 2011) notion of ‘hyperstition’ as such a successor concept and draw a picture of normativity as an emergent intensive regime which, by way of we-attitudes as its manner of causally affecting the world, institutes a novel kind of hyperstitional dynamics which can turn ‘lies into truths’. This is a way of illustrating and developing my basic immanent materialist view of normativity according to which its causal power lies exclusively in the enactment of normative statuses in the corresponding (we)attitudes. Moreover, building on Kukla’s (Philos Stud 101:161–211, 2000) suggestion that at the core of the function of ideology lies the misrecognition of a norm for correctly perceiving, thinking and acting as always already binding, it is further argued that this way of construing normativity can throw light on the phenomenon of ideology. From this point of view, ideology in its most general form consists in construing our fundamental lifeworld categories as representational, that is, as cutting nature and society at its categorial joints. Further, it is suggested that hyperstitional dynamics is best seen as bifurcated in a non-conceptual and conceptual dimension: non-conceptual-level hyperstitional dynamics can be understood in terms of predictive processing (Clark, Surfing uncertainty: Prediction, action and the embodied mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016; Clark, Andy Clark and his critics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019), whereas conceptual-level hyperstitional dynamics can be construed in terms of Brandom’s neo-Hegelian model of content determination and conceptual change (Brandom, Reason in philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2019).