Why do states who are not threatened deploy their armed forces in various speeds and sizes? After the closure of the Afghanistan mission in March 2014, and the return of almost all military personnel to Canada, the government was presented with a distinctive opportunity to “re-set” the overseas posture of its armed forces. This chapter, the second empirical case study of four, examines Canada’s initial military reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian provinces of Donestsk and Luhansk (OPERATION UNIFIER). Here the Canadian government deployed a relatively smaller contingent quickly because the bureaucracy was able to reach a consensus that their interests were being met over a number of weeks. I argue that while there were some departments empowered by the executive, there were other departments which preferred to delay and reduce the size of the mission. The deployment to Ukraine demonstrates how Canadian federal departments, seen through Bureaucratic Intervention Theory, were able to recommend joining the US-led Multinational Joint Commission efforts in Ukraine. Based on anonymous interviews with senior public servants and military officers, the chapter explains how the different departments were able to reach a consensus and shape the final deployment recommendation to Cabinet, noting the importance of the Treasury Board Secretariat and Finance Department as government agents which were able to manipulate the outcome of the decision-making process.