The aim of this chapter is to review the criticism of the self-sufficient individual and to consider how autonomy can be thought from the subjects-in-common. As Goikoetxea affirms, “one is not born a subject, it is made”. Subjects are not autonomous owners of themselves. Instead, they are constantly overcome and dispossessed by the relationships that constitute them. If the subject is made and determined, how can autonomy be thought of? Our hypothesis is that being determined, done and dispossessed, is a precondition for autonomy instead of an external limit to it, although it is not a guarantee. The question is how to determine it. The question is not, therefore, whether one has or does not have links, but about what kind of links one has. In conclusion, against the model of autonomy understood as a pre-social property of a self-sufficient individual, we propose an alternative model of autonomy: a situated and plural capacity for self-governance developed within, through, and against social relationships.