While the third chapter explores the challenges associated with funding extended to public entities, the fourth focuses on the practice developed in the context of investment projects involving indigenous peoples, where the recipients are typically business enterprises or financial intermediaries. The analysis unfolds along two main directions. First, it explores the policies governing operations financed by IFC, which explicitly reference international human rights law, while clarifying that the institution has always held a well-defined due diligence role during the pre-appraisal phase, due to the strong ownership of the project by the borrower. Second, it investigates the cases handled by the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman—the Independent Accountability Mechanism responsible for assessing IFC’s compliance with its own policies—highlighting that, in its dispute resolution function, it has primarily facilitated indigenous peoples’ access to remedy. Notably, the analysis gives particular consideration to the most recent strand of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman’s practice, which is especially significant as it addresses instances of non-compliance with the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent requirement, first introduced by IFC in its 2012 update to the Sustainability Framework, thus preceding its formal adoption by the World Bank.

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Relevant Practice Concerning Indigenous Peoples in Private Sector Projects

  • Silvia Solidoro

摘要

While the third chapter explores the challenges associated with funding extended to public entities, the fourth focuses on the practice developed in the context of investment projects involving indigenous peoples, where the recipients are typically business enterprises or financial intermediaries. The analysis unfolds along two main directions. First, it explores the policies governing operations financed by IFC, which explicitly reference international human rights law, while clarifying that the institution has always held a well-defined due diligence role during the pre-appraisal phase, due to the strong ownership of the project by the borrower. Second, it investigates the cases handled by the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman—the Independent Accountability Mechanism responsible for assessing IFC’s compliance with its own policies—highlighting that, in its dispute resolution function, it has primarily facilitated indigenous peoples’ access to remedy. Notably, the analysis gives particular consideration to the most recent strand of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman’s practice, which is especially significant as it addresses instances of non-compliance with the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent requirement, first introduced by IFC in its 2012 update to the Sustainability Framework, thus preceding its formal adoption by the World Bank.