ACEditor: A Modeling Tool for Specifying and Synthesizing Executable Assurance Cases from Fault Trees
摘要
Modern cyber-physical systems in the automotive and other critical domains demand the justification and demonstration they are safe and their components reliable. Assurance cases provide a means for justifying and assessing confidence in system dependability properties with references to design, safety, security, and reliability artifacts. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the most popular safety analysis techniques, which is an integral part of Model-Based Safety Assessment.. However, the open and adaptive nature of autonomous systems, demands a paradigm shift from design-time to runtime system assurance. Although the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) standard, its visual notation, and patterns extensions provide the foundations for runtime system assurance, enabling traceability between assurance cases and external artifacts, such as fault tree models, which are part of Executable Digital Dependability Identities (EDDIs) of cyber-physical system components, still remains a challenge. In this paper, we introduce ACEditor, a tool for specifying SACM assurance case patterns with traceability to external artifacts, which are part of a component EDDI, as a step towards runtime assurance demonstration.