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We revisit “silent coercion” where an adversary gains access to a voter’s credential without the voter’s knowledge in an E2E verifiable, coercion-resistant Internet voting system. We argue that in this setting, casting an intended vote is impossible since the cryptographic backend can no longer distinguish the voter and adversary. However, we affirm that the voter can still act to nullify adversarial ballots, which is preferable to inaction. We provide a new instantiation of nullification using zero-knowledge proofs and multiparty computation, which improves on the efficiency of the current state-of-the-art. We also demonstrate an example voting system—VoteXX—that uses nullification. Our nullification protocol can complement new and existing techniques for coercion resistance (which all require voters to hide cryptographic keys from the coercer), providing a failsafe option for voters whose keys leak.

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Revisiting Silent Coercion

  • 会议论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • David Chaum,
  • Richard T. Carback,
  • Jeremy Clark,
  • Chao Liu,
  • Mahdi Nejadgholi,
  • Bart Preneel,
  • Alan T. Sherman,
  • Mario Yaksetig,
  • Zeyuan Yin,
  • Filip Zagórski,
  • Bingsheng Zhang

摘要

We revisit “silent coercion” where an adversary gains access to a voter’s credential without the voter’s knowledge in an E2E verifiable, coercion-resistant Internet voting system. We argue that in this setting, casting an intended vote is impossible since the cryptographic backend can no longer distinguish the voter and adversary. However, we affirm that the voter can still act to nullify adversarial ballots, which is preferable to inaction. We provide a new instantiation of nullification using zero-knowledge proofs and multiparty computation, which improves on the efficiency of the current state-of-the-art. We also demonstrate an example voting system—VoteXX—that uses nullification. Our nullification protocol can complement new and existing techniques for coercion resistance (which all require voters to hide cryptographic keys from the coercer), providing a failsafe option for voters whose keys leak.