We continue here with the re-examination of the fundamental pillars of liberalism by addressing the difficult question of equality. Here too, we opt for a method of analysis that will allow us not only to express that which we think is right and therefore part of our conception of socio-liberalism but also to juxtapose it vis a vie existing and competing approaches to the subject. In this way we allow the reader to see what equality should mean given our premises as well as identify the ‘price’ that must be paid by adopting alternative approaches. At the heart of this method, as was the case with liberty, is the reliance on a composite and continuous notion of equality. Thus, we look at equality as spanning (continuously) all the way from equality of being to equality of consequences. Naturally, the way we understand equality depends on the way we understand the concept of human beings. Thus, different approaches to equality measured in terms of these components will reflect different attitudes towards not only the meaning of being human but also about that part of our humanity which makes us equal and that which accentuates our particularity and hence individuality. As in the case of liberty, we also look at the relationship between the continuous concept of equality and the continuity of social institutions—defined in similar terms—which may support it. Juxtaposing the desired notions of equality with what is institutionally feasible, we find ourselves in the position where the composite notion of equality is maximised in a feasible manner only under an ideal which institutionalises public actions and planning beyond the mere corrective approach of removing external barriers that stand before an ideal of natural liberty.