Susan Stebbing’s later work is highly concerned with the public life of science and logic: how is technical and abstract knowledge presented to general readers, and how are they equipped to make sense of it? In Philosophy and the Physicists (1937), she criticized two popular scientific authors, Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington, for misrepresenting the philosophical implications of modern physics. Stebbing’s critique is grounded in a refusal to grant philosophical claims made by physicists authority derived from their professional role. On the one hand, she elevates the ‘common reader’ as an imagined ideal, an intelligent non-expert at once liable to be misled but also insightful in ways the experts were not. On the other hand, she insists that philosophy is a domain of expertise distinct from physics. By developing a philosophy of physicists as much as or more than a philosophy of physics, Stebbing translates metaphysical questions into practical social questions of expertise. At stake is not only disciplinary territory, but also the morally urgent question of the meaning of free will. She charges physicists with obscuring the nature of human responsibility at a historical moment when a sound appreciation of responsibility is imperative.