This chapter explores Stebbing’s connection to idealism. It argues that, in a characteristically careful (and charitable) fashion, Stebbing is not outright dismissive of idealism, nor does she suggest it is obviously false. Indeed, her own worldview, which she calls ‘realism’, is not necessarily incompatible with an idealist analysis of reality. For that reason, this chapter argues that Stebbing adds a level of complexity to our understanding of the relation between early analytic philosophy and idealism. Section 1 outlines Stebbing’s own metaphysical stance, which she calls ‘realism’, and explains why that position does not necessarily preclude idealism. Section 2 outlines Stebbing’s criticisms of attempts to move from developments in modern physics to idealism. Finally, Sect. 3 assesses how Stebbing’s position relates to more general attitudes towards idealism in early analytic philosophy and argues that, compared to contemporaries like Moore or Russell, Stebbing’s approach offers a more tolerant vision of analytic philosophy’s relation to idealism, even if she was critical of certain attempts to argue for it.