The chapter explores the conversations and debates on human rights in African philosophy. It specifically focuses on what I describe as the ‘classical’ theories of human rights in African philosophy. I regard the theories by Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye as ‘classical’ since they were among the first written contributions in the English-speaking literature on human rights in African philosophy (Matolino 2013). The literature tends to construe Ifeanyi Menkiti’s philosophical contribution to personhood, ethics and Afro-communitarianism to amount to the political view of radical communitarianism (Gyekye 1992; Oyowe 2014). Menkiti could be construed to be advocating for a duty-based political theory that assigns a secondary status to human rights. Gyekye, on the other hand, articulates a dual conception of personhood (i.e., it is composed of individual and relational features), and he accounts for the relation between the individual and community that amounts to the political theory of moderate communitarianism (Gyekye 1997). In this view, duties and rights have equal status (although when the two clash the former ought to take priority). This chapter will focus on the debate between radical and moderate communitarianism to provide the reader with a picture of human rights in African philosophy.