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This chapter examines the rise and consolidation of non-state armed actors (NSAAs) in Lebanon and Libya. It analyzes the sociopolitical conditions that fostered their emergence and evolution, and it explores how state fragility, sectarian divisions, and foreign interventions shaped their trajectories. Using a comparative framework, the chapter highlights Hezbollah’s strategic integration into Lebanon’s political and social fabric contrasting it with the fragmented nature of Libya’s armed groups in the post-Gaddafi era. The findings underscore the challenges of NSAA governance and its implications for regional stability and state-building efforts. In Lebanon, it studies the conditions that allowed a number of non-state armed groups to be established and grow between the 1960s and the 1990s, as well as the circumstances that allowed Hezbollah to overcome the decision to disarm the non-state armed groups agreed upon by the Lebanese Members of Parliament (MP) and spelled out in the Taif agreement that ended the war in 1990. Furthermore, the chapter analyzes the process through which Hezbollah was able to build a large constituency—and therefore strengthen its legitimacy—among the Lebanese Shias and how key events either helped or actually undermined the party’s effort to solidify its popular base, among Shias but also across Lebanon’s sectarian board. The analysis includes an assessment of how the absence—or flawed/poor performance—of state security institutions creates a permissive environment for Hezbollah to thrive and how the latter made sure to protect this space by undermining the work of state institutions. In Libya, the chapter articulates the process through which community-based voluntary initiatives started in the wake of the 2011 uprising grew and shaped with time to become non-state armed actors and how international and regional interference encouraged these groups to grow in size and importance. The chapter discusses the factors and mechanisms that allowed the major groups to acquire popular legitimacy as well as studying the conditions that led to an almost total cooptation of state institutions by these non-state armed groups (rather than the opposite). Last but not least, the chapter identifies the similarities and differences in both countries.

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Armed Non-state Actors in Lebanon and Libya: A Comparative Analysis

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Elie Abouaoun,
  • Molly Gallagher

摘要

This chapter examines the rise and consolidation of non-state armed actors (NSAAs) in Lebanon and Libya. It analyzes the sociopolitical conditions that fostered their emergence and evolution, and it explores how state fragility, sectarian divisions, and foreign interventions shaped their trajectories. Using a comparative framework, the chapter highlights Hezbollah’s strategic integration into Lebanon’s political and social fabric contrasting it with the fragmented nature of Libya’s armed groups in the post-Gaddafi era. The findings underscore the challenges of NSAA governance and its implications for regional stability and state-building efforts. In Lebanon, it studies the conditions that allowed a number of non-state armed groups to be established and grow between the 1960s and the 1990s, as well as the circumstances that allowed Hezbollah to overcome the decision to disarm the non-state armed groups agreed upon by the Lebanese Members of Parliament (MP) and spelled out in the Taif agreement that ended the war in 1990. Furthermore, the chapter analyzes the process through which Hezbollah was able to build a large constituency—and therefore strengthen its legitimacy—among the Lebanese Shias and how key events either helped or actually undermined the party’s effort to solidify its popular base, among Shias but also across Lebanon’s sectarian board. The analysis includes an assessment of how the absence—or flawed/poor performance—of state security institutions creates a permissive environment for Hezbollah to thrive and how the latter made sure to protect this space by undermining the work of state institutions. In Libya, the chapter articulates the process through which community-based voluntary initiatives started in the wake of the 2011 uprising grew and shaped with time to become non-state armed actors and how international and regional interference encouraged these groups to grow in size and importance. The chapter discusses the factors and mechanisms that allowed the major groups to acquire popular legitimacy as well as studying the conditions that led to an almost total cooptation of state institutions by these non-state armed groups (rather than the opposite). Last but not least, the chapter identifies the similarities and differences in both countries.