This chapter explores a series of arguments for anti-natalism on the assumption that Christian universalism is true. I argue none of the Asymmetry Argument, the Misanthropic Argument, the Exploitation Argument, or Argument from the Right to Physical Security are defeated by the assumption of universalism. Christians still need to grapple with these arguments in their own right, even if universalism is true. I then explore two pro-natalist arguments which emerge from the assumption of Christian universalism since everyone’s offspring will end up in heaven. The first of these is a reformulated quality of life argument that takes into account the fact that everyone ends up in heaven. I challenge the scope of this argument by showing that the great good of heaven does not automatically make every life worth starting. The second focuses on the claim that every human created is intrinsically and finally valuable. I suggest that one potential problem for this argument is the absurd implication that humans should procreate as much as possible. I conclude by offering what I take to be the strongest argument for anti-natalism on the assumption that Christian universalism is true. This is a risk-based argument which focuses on the idea that if there is a chance that one’s offspring will be deprived of heaven, where the alternative afterlife outcomes are harmful, then procreation still involves forcing the risk of a significant harm on a non-consenting person.