This chapter offers three different risk-based arguments for anti-natalism that are intended to apply to Christians who are exclusivists. The arguments suggest that for Christians who believe (i) in a literal hell and (ii) that each person born could end up in hell, that procreation is impermissible. The risk of going to hell should not be imposed on a non-consenting person. Of course, just what constitutes hell and the likelihood one ends up there, play a role in the force of this argument. I conclude that on traditional understandings of hell even a very slight risk of ending up there makes procreation impermissible. I further argue that the scope of this argument applies well beyond Christian exclusivism; anyone who believes there is a chance their offspring could end up in hell ought to refrain from procreating. After this I briefly examine some of the more obvious objections to the argument, including those that say hell is either not that bad or is imposed justly. To conclude, I explore the extent to which some of the other arguments for anti-natalism can be modified in order to develop unique arguments for anti-natalism that apply to Chrisitan exclusivism.