A variety of historical cases demonstrate the positive impact of civil nuclear technology as a form of inducement during nuclear arms control (NAC) negotiations. However, NAC literature has largely focused on analysing the use of such tools within specific NAC negotiation settings, often overlooking their broader significance and general validity. Economic inducements, such as support for civil nuclear energy programmes, have been studied in relation to nuclear reversal decisions by proliferators (Mehta, 2020). Similarly, the bargaining power offered by peaceful nuclear technology has been examined primarily as a means for attracting more countries into formal agreements, with great focus on the Nonproliferation Treaty (Gibbons, 2020). Specific non-proliferation cases, such as post-Soviet Ukraine, have also been addressed in isolation (Potter, 1995), without adequately connecting them to other historical events that shared similar negotiation strategies among the involved parties. This chapter explores relevant cases where civil nuclear technology was used by providers to increase the chances of the receiver country to participate more extensively in NAC institutions. It will then isolate common factors that were central in the causal mechanism leading to the success of the negotiations.