When we think of future hybrid societies, this goes far beyond conventional scenarios. We have long since moved away from humans working only by hand or with the help of machines, and we already find technologized humans, humanized technology, and hybrid entities within a society, and even more so in the future. In this paper, we explore how all these entities fit into existing legal, psychological, and sociological constructions. We shed light on the attributions to an acting entity from the respective disciplines and explore whether hybrid entities can possess personality, paving the way for a hybrid personae. It becomes clear that at the core of conventional considerations is the biological person. Based on common definitions of person and personality, psychological considerations do not, up to now, grant personality to artificial actors. This explicitly excludes all kinds of technology where a human being is involved, irrespective of the level of technicity. Sociology can also designate machine entities as actors. The concept of person is always connected with the human being. In legal science, it is conceivable and not excluded in advance, to extend the concept of personhood to hybrid entities as well, at least under certain conditions and perspectives.

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Towards Hybrid Personae?

  • Stefanie Meyer,
  • Michael R. Müller,
  • Anne Sonnenmoser,
  • Sarah Mandl,
  • Anja Strobel,
  • Dagmar Gesmann-Nuissl

摘要

When we think of future hybrid societies, this goes far beyond conventional scenarios. We have long since moved away from humans working only by hand or with the help of machines, and we already find technologized humans, humanized technology, and hybrid entities within a society, and even more so in the future. In this paper, we explore how all these entities fit into existing legal, psychological, and sociological constructions. We shed light on the attributions to an acting entity from the respective disciplines and explore whether hybrid entities can possess personality, paving the way for a hybrid personae. It becomes clear that at the core of conventional considerations is the biological person. Based on common definitions of person and personality, psychological considerations do not, up to now, grant personality to artificial actors. This explicitly excludes all kinds of technology where a human being is involved, irrespective of the level of technicity. Sociology can also designate machine entities as actors. The concept of person is always connected with the human being. In legal science, it is conceivable and not excluded in advance, to extend the concept of personhood to hybrid entities as well, at least under certain conditions and perspectives.