The Spinoza Controversy, in my reading, ultimately turns on whether theoretical reason will be controlled and directed by the whole, metarational person, by the inner self, or whether the reverse will hold. Any neo-Jacobian opposition to the annihilation of the external world as the spatial correlate of CM originates in the restoration and preservation of the metarational subject. Before the subject (and all other life on earth) can regain the freedom to live in and experience a world not supersaturated by the activities and outputs of the human species alone, the subject must reinstate the phanic inner self’s license to dispassionately and thoroughly reconsider all aspects of our commitment to phagic pseudo-worlds, beginning with questioning theoretical reason’s foundational claim to be equipped to ontologize a single Nature-nature, a real-ideal infinite absolute, in and “as” necessity alone. We can also then reconsider how to engage with additional metarational questions, including the question of whether, why, and in which cases the world as it is in itself must be insulated (both cognitively or from the point of view of reason; and physically) from theorized ontologies of necessity and the “worlds” they posit in its stead, and where, if anywhere, the reverse must be allowed to continue. Given the deep entrenchment of CM, even these simple beginnings need the Controversy framing to anchor them.