The Spinoza Controversy in a sense both symbolized and in its small way helped further catalyze the significant shift taking place around 1800 in the European subject (again, “subject” here meant in the Jacobian sense) from an Enlightenment to a post-Enlightenment form(s). And while the post-Enlightenment, and post-Controversy, Western subject has taken many forms (and continues to evolve), common to almost all of them has been both the view that the Jacobian position of circa 1800 is negligible or not as serious as the naturalist position, and, relatedly, the adherence to a certain core idea of nature (and the absence of real limits on our scientific knowledge of it) that has its origins in the circa 1800 early German romantic philosophy of nature developed by thinkers like F. Schlegel, Schelling, Novalis, and Hölderlin. Aside from Schelling, these key German romantic writers were also poets, novelists, critics, and essayists; but they are also now largely recognized as philosophical thinkers, ones whose philosophy of nature was not confined to Schelling’s Naturphilosophie—his more formal effort to directly speculate on nature conceived of in Spinozistic terms forming but one facet of these romantics’ efforts to approach nature anew. During the Controversy, these thinkers were diluted among a number of other basically pro-Spinozist positions, positions with which these romantics were engaging and upon which they were seeking to build. In the roughly two centuries since the Controversy, the early German romantic philosophy of nature has arguably proven itself the most important and persistent vehicle of the Spinozistic (or neo-Spinozan–but not actually Spinozan) approach to reality which in each Controversy iteration has seemingly advanced its hold over Western mainstream views of nature and vanquished the Jacobian or neo-Jacobian side.