In this book I will deal with some of the most important works of two authors of contemporary philosophy, who share many interests in the field of perception. They represent distinct lines of research in philosophy. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Rochefort-sur-Mer, March 14, 1908 to Paris, May 3, 1961), a phenomenologist, the author of The Phenomenology of Perception (first published in 1945), and Gilbert Ryle (Brighton, August 19, 1900 to Whitby, October 6, 1976), an analytical philosopher, author of The Concept of Mind (first published in 1949). My emphasis is that it is does not really matter which line of research each one belongs to, since I intend to demonstrate how the approach of both is directed towards similar objectives in philosophy. It is my intention to make approximations between the work of these two philosophers, and show certain abysses created by philosophical is vanities, that do not should represent methodological distances to understand both philosophies seem is so evident to me.