Within limits, many governments can choose the time at which they will be held accountable. There are few exceptions: Switzerland and Norway, for instance. The end of the mandate, in most cases, is not exogenous. This flexibility of mandates is an important institutional characteristic of parliamentarism. The chapter studies the use by incumbents of this flexibility to their advantage. This strategy is carried out when present conditions are good and when the future prospects are bleak. It is a strategy that is more likely to be used under single party governments. To what extent does this strategy influence the likelihood of survival of incumbent governments? The chapter studies 22 parliamentary democracies from 1945 onwards. Of 332 elections, 245 were anticipated by the incumbent. On average, the anticipation was of 6.3 months before the end of the mandate. Using this strategy, Bruno Kreisky in Austria in 1971 and Harold Wilson in the United Kingdom moved from minority governments to majoritarian ones. Felipe González in Spain had experienced losses in his support in 1986 (due to a controversial referendum on Spain's membership of NATO), in 1989 (due to a successful general strike), in 1993 (due to some scandals). His government experienced losses but preserved a majority of seats. But prime ministers can make mistakes when using this strategy: this was the case of Olof Palme in September 1970. What are the reaction of voters to an electoral anticipation? With incomplete information, do they see the political decision as opportunistic? Do they interpret it as an indication that a bleak future lies ahead? Opinion polls do not show a fall in the popularity of prime ministers that call early elections. And electoral anticipation is not usually followed by a decline in economic growth.