The chapter studies strategies by incumbent politicians to survive divergences between policy outcomes and voters’ preferences. It uses as illustrations episodes of Spanish politics between 1982 and 1996. A considerable part of the evidence is of a qualitative kind, its source being personal inside information. Do elections influence policies prospectively? Can future policies be predicted from the electoral promises of the winning party? External conditions may change. Do incumbent politicians adhere to their promises if they consider that, in the new circumstances, the interests of voters can be harmed? What explanations do they offer to voters to get their approval of a betrayal of electoral promises? What strategies the incumbent government follow to get the support of the ruling party for political changes of course? Do incumbent parties help the governments who carry out this U-turn from electoral promises? What is the reaction of the opposition parties to the unforeseen change on external conditions? The chapter examines the strategies of governments first toward their supporting parties and then toward voters in general. The chapter studies different instruments that politicians in office use in order to get support for policy choices that did not previous electoral support. One particularly remarkable strategy is the use of referenda. Examples are the referenda in the United Kingdom in 1974 on membership in the European Community, in Denmark in 1992, in France in 1993, in Spain in 1976 on NATO. Another strategy is the guarantee of compensatory policies, very often, social reforms. Also, the presentation of the new policy as an “inevitable” choice, the promise of “light at the end of the tunnel,” the popularity of a leadership whose continuity is at stake.