This chapter introduces liberal welfarism, beginning with a conceptual unpacking of liberty and motivation in their dual dimensions. Liberty is examined through its negative (freedom from interference) and positive (freedom to act) forms, while motivation is considered in both selfish and selfless terms. These dimensions are shown to have direct implications for how welfare and freedom are understood. Building on this foundation, the chapter compares how libertarian paternalism (LP) and the capability approach (CA) interpret these values. LP is shown to offer a narrower perspective, primarily addressing negative liberty and welfare in terms of self-regarding motivations. In contrast, the CA presents a broader framework that includes positive liberty and wellbeing expressed as both self- and other-regarding motivations. The potential for integrating LP and the CA is then explored as a strategy to overcome their respective limitations. While such a synthesis broadens the conceptual scope, it also reveals a persistent gap. In response, liberal welfarism is introduced as an approach to governance that, although draws from both LP and the CA, also transcends them. It is positioned as a more comprehensive framework, capable of encompassing all the domains addressed by LP and the CA individually and jointly, as well as that left unaddressed by their combination.

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Liberal Welfarism

  • Pablo Garcés-Velástegui

摘要

This chapter introduces liberal welfarism, beginning with a conceptual unpacking of liberty and motivation in their dual dimensions. Liberty is examined through its negative (freedom from interference) and positive (freedom to act) forms, while motivation is considered in both selfish and selfless terms. These dimensions are shown to have direct implications for how welfare and freedom are understood. Building on this foundation, the chapter compares how libertarian paternalism (LP) and the capability approach (CA) interpret these values. LP is shown to offer a narrower perspective, primarily addressing negative liberty and welfare in terms of self-regarding motivations. In contrast, the CA presents a broader framework that includes positive liberty and wellbeing expressed as both self- and other-regarding motivations. The potential for integrating LP and the CA is then explored as a strategy to overcome their respective limitations. While such a synthesis broadens the conceptual scope, it also reveals a persistent gap. In response, liberal welfarism is introduced as an approach to governance that, although draws from both LP and the CA, also transcends them. It is positioned as a more comprehensive framework, capable of encompassing all the domains addressed by LP and the CA individually and jointly, as well as that left unaddressed by their combination.