In this chapter, I depart from the assumption that the viability of Cameroon’s constitutional right to a healthy environment would be futile if not adjudicated and strengthened by the courts. Traditionally, courts can devise creative ways to promote and ensure environmental protection, either beyond black letter law interpretation or the vigorous interpretation of environmental laws, including constitutional environmental rights. I argue that either of these approaches is welcoming in Cameroon’s environmental space since courts are the last hope for recourse to environmental harm. Yet, so far, the jurisprudence on environmental rights in Cameroon reveals a disappointing stark contrast: the overt failure of the courts to fully engage with the normative interpretation and application of the right and determine the obligations of states and non-state parties, or make useful connections between pollution and ecological degradation, climate change impacts, or waste management and the constitutional environmental right in the array of cases before it. Even if the lack of engagement could be attributed to the complexity of environmental matters or difficulties with competing priorities and the issue of legal standing, it is somewhat disappointing to see the court failing to play its interpretative role. Furthermore, the fluidity of the separation of power doctrine in Cameroon has restricted the court from exercising its functions, particularly so, in the environmental context. While the literature on Cameroon’s environmental governance abounds, the role of the court has been eschewed, and investigating how and whether the courts have been able to play this role, fills this research lacunae. In this chapter, I reflect on the important role of the Cameroonian judiciary in the environmental space and question whether their role could be the primer for strengthening the protection of the constitutional right to a healthy environment. The purpose of this investigation is to ascertain whether (1) the court’s role has been consistent with the constitutional environmental green helmet, and (2) if Cameroonian courts could be considered agents of (environmental) change. I specifically demonstrate from jurisprudential analysis, the missed opportunities by the Cameroonian judiciary to connect the missing puzzle with the constitutional environmental right in the array of cases before it. I conclude that courts be allowed to play their role and be able to give wider discretion to interpret relevant provisions in furtherance to the constitutional mandate on the State to guarantee the right to a healthy environment to all Cameroonians.