Latvia has been a target of Russian influence operations due to its historical, geographical, and cultural closeness. The aggressiveness of such operations has increased after Russia launched full-scale warfare against Ukraine in 2022. It has introduced the requirement for Latvian political decision-makers to limit Russian influence operations significantly, which were aimed at dividing the nation. Therefore, it is very important to comprehend what measures must be undertaken by Latvia to counter Russian influence operations. The chapter conceptualizes “influence operations” and describes the use of all instruments of national power, such as informational, diplomatic, economic, military, and others of one country, to influence the beliefs and behaviour of target audiences in another country. It is discussed in the context of NATO expansion and changes in Latvia's demographic structure, and an attempt to use the so-called “compatriot policy” by Russia. The chapter is founded by secondary data, it summarizes and analyses Latvia’s non-military solutions to limit Russian influence operations, it concludes that the steps taken by Latvia in the short term increased the polarization of opinions: in the long term, it will reduce effectiveness of Russian influence operations.

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Severing Ties with Russia: The Effects of the Russo-Ukrainian War on Latvia

  • Ieva Berzina

摘要

Latvia has been a target of Russian influence operations due to its historical, geographical, and cultural closeness. The aggressiveness of such operations has increased after Russia launched full-scale warfare against Ukraine in 2022. It has introduced the requirement for Latvian political decision-makers to limit Russian influence operations significantly, which were aimed at dividing the nation. Therefore, it is very important to comprehend what measures must be undertaken by Latvia to counter Russian influence operations. The chapter conceptualizes “influence operations” and describes the use of all instruments of national power, such as informational, diplomatic, economic, military, and others of one country, to influence the beliefs and behaviour of target audiences in another country. It is discussed in the context of NATO expansion and changes in Latvia's demographic structure, and an attempt to use the so-called “compatriot policy” by Russia. The chapter is founded by secondary data, it summarizes and analyses Latvia’s non-military solutions to limit Russian influence operations, it concludes that the steps taken by Latvia in the short term increased the polarization of opinions: in the long term, it will reduce effectiveness of Russian influence operations.