There is a vast philosophical literature about the so-called ‘Received View’, according to which quantum objects like electrons and photons, among others, cannot be regarded as individuals. That belief is due to a radical concept of indistinguishability relationship between objects which, in turn, constitute some physical systems. More specifically, such a belief is partially inspired on a vague idea referred to as the Leibniz Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (LPII), which states there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. The vagueness in LPII is due to a lack of a precise concept of property. In this paper I argue that any discussion regarding individuality of quantum objects (and even classical objects) has, so far, nothing to do with physics at all. What matters in quantum physics, from a theoretical point of view, is how quantum objects relate with each other in a measurable way. So, no important implication can be derived for the realism-antirealism debate if we focus on the issue of quantum individuality. My main purpose here is to suggest two possible approaches for dealing with the usual concept of indiscernibility between quantum objects without any reference to the concept of individuality. And none of those approaches considers indistinguishability is somehow related to either identity or individuality.