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This work performs a side-channel analysis on the Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption cipher Elisabeth-b4. In particular, a Correlation Power Analysis allows to recover the 2048-bit key with 35,000 traces. Mounting template attacks or using Machine Learning decreases this number to 1,000. We then implement 2-share masking and shuffling, which completely eliminates the leakage measure – a Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) – and mitigates the Correlation Power Analysis and template attacks. Using a Divide and Conquer Deep Learning approach, we manage to bypass them but the number of required traces increases to 250,000.

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Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption Resistance to Side-Channel Attacks

  • 会议论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Pierugo Pace,
  • Hervé Pelletier,
  • Serge Vaudenay

摘要

This work performs a side-channel analysis on the Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption cipher Elisabeth-b4. In particular, a Correlation Power Analysis allows to recover the 2048-bit key with 35,000 traces. Mounting template attacks or using Machine Learning decreases this number to 1,000. We then implement 2-share masking and shuffling, which completely eliminates the leakage measure – a Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) – and mitigates the Correlation Power Analysis and template attacks. Using a Divide and Conquer Deep Learning approach, we manage to bypass them but the number of required traces increases to 250,000.