After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Aleš Hojs, the Slovenian Interior Minister who was also a part of Janez Janša’s right-wing government, told his EU counterparts that Slovenia was ‘willing to accept up to 200,000 Ukrainian refugees’ (Slovenia Times, 2022). Hojs stated for the press that Slovenia had the ability to accept such a large number of refugees from Ukraine as it had previously hosted 300,000 refugees during the post-Yugoslav wars in the 1990s (ibid.). But his statement to the media was full of inconsistencies, such as that Slovenia had been supporting Ukraine since the Russian invasion, which was not the case, as there was no support for Ukrainian refugees in Slovenia when the invasion began in 2014 (Düvell & Lapshyna, 2022). After the 2014 invasion, around 1.5 million Ukrainian citizens became internally displaced and a couple of thousand who sought asylum in Poland in 2015 did not have any prospect of being recognised as refugees; similarly, there was no statement of support from other Central European countries, including Slovenia, when it came to displaced citizens of Ukraine (UNHCR Central Europe, 2015). Furthermore, the 300,000 refugees from post-Yugoslav space did not reflect any of the official statistics of how many refugees Slovenia hosted on a temporary basis in the 1990s. The figure approximates the number of all (post-)Yugoslav migrants in Slovenia who mostly moved to Slovenia during the period of Socialist Yugoslavia before the 1990s. In addition, the Slovenian media did not mention how, according to the Contingency Plan in 2015, there was only the capacity to accept 1000 refugees (see Chap. 4 ). And even though the EU Member States agreed to host a few million Ukrainian refugees in 2022, they agreed to do so on the basis of temporary protection, which, in reality, meant most Ukrainian refugees were not officially recognised as refugees in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention.