Following the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey entered the modern Eurocentric interstate system as a nation-state, transitioning from its imperial past. Unlike the Balkan states that secured independence by expelling Ottoman rule, Turkey’s trajectory was reversed—from empire to nationhood. Nonetheless, its hegemonic ambitions endured. The ideology of Pan-Turkism re-emerged in the mid-twentieth century, with Turkish nationalist organizations such as the Union of Turkish Nationalists and Kıbrıs Türktür actively shaping public discourse and foreign policy concerning Cyprus. Initially indifferent, Turkish policy shifted decisively following British encouragement in 1954, aligning with Ankara’s broader strategic objectives and domestic imperatives. Neoclassical realism provides a useful framework for understanding how domestic factors and elite decisions—such as the appointment of Zorlu—were instrumental in shaping Turkey’s Cyprus strategy. A pivotal moment was the drafting of the “White Paper” and the strategic directives of Nihat Erim, who underscored Cyprus’s military importance to Turkey and advocated a policy opposing enosis while favoring either British retention or partition. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy evolved into a deliberate and calculated effort to assert its claims over Cyprus, leveraging nationalist organizations, propaganda, and external alliances to influence the island’s geopolitical dynamics.