This chapter explores Britain’s strategic use of the 1955 Tripartite Conference to manipulate the Cyprus issue in line with its imperial objectives. Facing mounting pressure from both the Greek Cypriot movement and the United Nations, Britain sought to internationalize the dispute by inviting Turkey—a party that had previously renounced claims over Cyprus. This move effectively reframed the issue as a Greek–Turkish conflict and positioned Britain as a neutral mediator. The British collaboration with Turkey, alongside efforts to counteract Greece’s UN initiatives, was part of a broader hegemonic strategy to maintain control over Cyprus as a vital military base. The Greek government reluctantly accepted participation, despite internal opposition and warnings about British–Turkish alignment. During the conference, Turkey, with Britain’s support, asserted strategic claims to the island. The conference concluded amid the orchestrated Istanbul pogrom against Greeks, which further legitimized Turkey’s aggressive stance. Ultimately, Britain succeeded in institutionalizing Turkey’s role in the Cyprus issue, while the United States remained passive, prioritizing NATO unity over justice, thereby enabling the shift toward partition.

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The Tripartite Conference of London

  • Nicos Panayiotides

摘要

This chapter explores Britain’s strategic use of the 1955 Tripartite Conference to manipulate the Cyprus issue in line with its imperial objectives. Facing mounting pressure from both the Greek Cypriot movement and the United Nations, Britain sought to internationalize the dispute by inviting Turkey—a party that had previously renounced claims over Cyprus. This move effectively reframed the issue as a Greek–Turkish conflict and positioned Britain as a neutral mediator. The British collaboration with Turkey, alongside efforts to counteract Greece’s UN initiatives, was part of a broader hegemonic strategy to maintain control over Cyprus as a vital military base. The Greek government reluctantly accepted participation, despite internal opposition and warnings about British–Turkish alignment. During the conference, Turkey, with Britain’s support, asserted strategic claims to the island. The conference concluded amid the orchestrated Istanbul pogrom against Greeks, which further legitimized Turkey’s aggressive stance. Ultimately, Britain succeeded in institutionalizing Turkey’s role in the Cyprus issue, while the United States remained passive, prioritizing NATO unity over justice, thereby enabling the shift toward partition.