This chapter outlines Britain’s attempt to impose the Macmillan Plan on Cyprus, aiming to preserve its colonial influence despite waning power. The United States, now dominant in global affairs, preferred a solution grounded in Cypriot independence, focusing on NATO unity. Greece, opposing partition, sought NATO mediation via Paul-Henri Spaak—then Secretary-General of NATO—who proposed a seven-year interim solution with limited success. Britain and Turkey rejected his plan, and the Greek government, disillusioned, turned to the United Nations. Under mounting pressure and recognizing the asymmetry of power, Archbishop Makarios abandoned the goal of Enosis and accepted independence. A shift in US policy supported this direction, leading to direct Greek–Turkish negotiations. These talks, shaped by US strategic goals, sidelined the Cypriots and laid the groundwork for the Zurich Agreement.

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Toward the Zurich Agreement—The Failed Spaak Mediation

  • Nicos Panayiotides

摘要

This chapter outlines Britain’s attempt to impose the Macmillan Plan on Cyprus, aiming to preserve its colonial influence despite waning power. The United States, now dominant in global affairs, preferred a solution grounded in Cypriot independence, focusing on NATO unity. Greece, opposing partition, sought NATO mediation via Paul-Henri Spaak—then Secretary-General of NATO—who proposed a seven-year interim solution with limited success. Britain and Turkey rejected his plan, and the Greek government, disillusioned, turned to the United Nations. Under mounting pressure and recognizing the asymmetry of power, Archbishop Makarios abandoned the goal of Enosis and accepted independence. A shift in US policy supported this direction, leading to direct Greek–Turkish negotiations. These talks, shaped by US strategic goals, sidelined the Cypriots and laid the groundwork for the Zurich Agreement.