This chapter offers a critique of the institutional design of Cameroon’s judicial appointment body, the Higher Judicial Council (HJC). It critically interrogates the extent to which the HJC can enhance or protect judicial independence in Cameroon. It is contended that the institutional design of the HJC, which has largely remained unaltered since its establishment, obviates the potentials to secure the independence of the judiciary. The author adopts institutional theory to argue that lack of progressive change to the structure and functioning of the HJC can be attributed to a path dependent approach to institutional evolution which is intrinsically linked to a political culture of executive dominance. The persistence of this institutional design in its original configuration, is part of a self-reinforcing process necessary to achieve the coordination effect—to ensure that the other institutions within the political system complement each other in maintaining a system of executive dominance. To consider the prospects for reforming the HJC, the author offers some reflections on the potentials for institutional transformations in political systems where institutional interdependence is deeply entrenched and underpinned by an established political culture.