Disputes among branches and levels of governments are bound to arise in federations. How do emerging federations ensure the supremacy of the constitution and address such dispute where power remains less institutionalized? Federal systems require an institution that impartially and peacefully umpires such disputes. Some federations assign this function to regular supreme courts while others allocate this task to constitutional courts. Ethiopia has assigned this function to a political organ, the House Federation as advised by quasi expert body. The empirical investigation over the House of Federation indicates that it has largely remained subservient to the political party in power resulting in centralized federation. It has failed to serve as guardian of the constitution, has rarely set limits on political power and largely failed to enforce human rights. This chapter establishes that Ethiopia’s case is a federation without constitutionalism and argues the case for establishing an impartial constitutional court that ensures supremacy of the constitution, resolves disputes impartially, enforces human rights and sets limits on power.