In this chapter, we argue that testimony as a path to recognition and justice needs to be conceived as a form of political action aimed at actively restoring historical memory through performative mechanisms. In what follows, we first thematize the experience of injustice and the struggle for institutional recognition based on Axel Honneth’s ideas. Then, we argue that it has not yet been possible to eliminate experiences of injustice, with the result that victims have proliferated. Finally, we problematize the role of testimony as the main resource available to victims in their struggle for recognition. In our view, Honneth’s theory of recognition provides a useful framework to amplify the voices of those who are victims of injustice. He identifies a gap between normative principles and experiences of injustice that are often overlooked in the process of creating norms. Thus, as we show, testimonies are an example of experiences that, despite their subjectivity, provide significant experiential aspects that must be taken into consideration when formulating normative principles.

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Victims, Testimony, and the Path to Recognition

  • Luis Xavier López-Farjeat,
  • Cecilia Coronado

摘要

In this chapter, we argue that testimony as a path to recognition and justice needs to be conceived as a form of political action aimed at actively restoring historical memory through performative mechanisms. In what follows, we first thematize the experience of injustice and the struggle for institutional recognition based on Axel Honneth’s ideas. Then, we argue that it has not yet been possible to eliminate experiences of injustice, with the result that victims have proliferated. Finally, we problematize the role of testimony as the main resource available to victims in their struggle for recognition. In our view, Honneth’s theory of recognition provides a useful framework to amplify the voices of those who are victims of injustice. He identifies a gap between normative principles and experiences of injustice that are often overlooked in the process of creating norms. Thus, as we show, testimonies are an example of experiences that, despite their subjectivity, provide significant experiential aspects that must be taken into consideration when formulating normative principles.