After several millennia of ink spilt on Aristotle’s philosophy, is there still something we can learn from him? We find that much of what is positive in modern philosophy—from Leibniz to Heidegger—is influenced by or derived from Aristotle. Aristotle’s broad philosophy of “being” is continued in the philosophy of such idealists as Leibniz and Hegel and by phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Husserl. Martin Heidegger’s consideration of the “thingliness of the thing” is an essentially Aristotelian insight. The centrality of Aristotle’s defence of “being” (ousia) has been set out in Chap. 6 . The parallel tradition of anti-philosophy, as set out in Chap. 2 , does by contrast seek to reduce meaning and hence denies “being,” “form,” and all “structure” and, ultimately, “meaning” itself. I argue here and throughout that the modern denial of “being” is not philosophically sound or required but is a product of what Aldous Huxley describes as a “philosophy of meaninglessness.”