This chapter examines Quentin Meillassoux’s philosophical contributions, particularly his critique of “correlationism”—the dominant post-Kantian view that we can only access the correlation between thought and being, never either term independently. Meillassoux challenges this stance by developing a position called “speculative materialism,” which asserts that the absolute contingency of reality (what he terms “hyper-chaos”) is knowable through rational demonstration. The chapter traces how Meillassoux inverts traditional metaphysics by arguing that contingency itself is necessary, thereby providing access to knowledge beyond human finitude while rejecting sufficient reason. His concept of “divine inexistence” posits not that God doesn’t exist, but that God doesn’t yet exist—opening the possibility for justice even for those who have died. By developing a “factual symbol” that binds being and value through recognition of absolute contingency, Meillassoux offers a fourth position beyond traditional theism, atheism, and correlationism, creating a robust framework for a nondogmatic hope that preserves religious aspirations within a materialist ontology while avoiding both naive Realism and correlational skepticism.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Correlationism and Its Discontents

  • Calvyn Clarence du Toit

摘要

This chapter examines Quentin Meillassoux’s philosophical contributions, particularly his critique of “correlationism”—the dominant post-Kantian view that we can only access the correlation between thought and being, never either term independently. Meillassoux challenges this stance by developing a position called “speculative materialism,” which asserts that the absolute contingency of reality (what he terms “hyper-chaos”) is knowable through rational demonstration. The chapter traces how Meillassoux inverts traditional metaphysics by arguing that contingency itself is necessary, thereby providing access to knowledge beyond human finitude while rejecting sufficient reason. His concept of “divine inexistence” posits not that God doesn’t exist, but that God doesn’t yet exist—opening the possibility for justice even for those who have died. By developing a “factual symbol” that binds being and value through recognition of absolute contingency, Meillassoux offers a fourth position beyond traditional theism, atheism, and correlationism, creating a robust framework for a nondogmatic hope that preserves religious aspirations within a materialist ontology while avoiding both naive Realism and correlational skepticism.