This essay examines the relationship between modality and theoretical virtues like simplicity and explanatory power. According to some metaphysicians, Ockham’s razor—when understood as a thesis that prizes ontological parsimony—has a modal analogue. According to the principle of Hume’s razor, theories fare better to the extent that they avoid positing metaphysical necessities. So understood, defenders of Hume’s razor seek to minimize necessities in much the same way that that defenders of Ockham’s razor seek to minimize ontological commitments. After exploring alternative formulations of Hume’s razor, the interaction of this principle with the Humean tradition in metaphysics is examined alongside its implications for a range of key metaphysical debates. This essay concludes by arguing that Hume’s razor addresses a methodological puzzle for those like David Lewis who accept theoretical virtues as a guide to metaphysical theories as well as a basic commitment to principles of Humean recombination.