Karen Bennett and Mary Beth Willard have both argued for "dismissivism" with respect to metaphysical disputes, and Darren Bradley, while not a proponent of dismissivism, has given additional arguments on its behalf. The idea is that we lack any very good grounds for deciding between many competing metaphysical theses. Perhaps they’re correct about some metaphysical disputes. But as a claim regarding metaphysical disputes in general, I don’t think that dismissivism is correct. The sort of epistemological impasse described by dismissivists isn’t nearly so widespread within metaphysics as they claim it is, and their arguments to the contrary are not compelling. For example, their contention that empirical considerations have no bearing on the resolution of most or all metaphysical disputes isn’t true of some major paradigmatically metaphysical disputes. Where empirical considerations do not bear on the resolution of a metaphysical dispute (or do not allow us to adjudicate some metaphysical dispute), non-empirical theoretical criteria can provide far more guidance than dismissivists realize. In general, the methodological misgivings dismissivists direct toward metaphysical disputes would, I argue, lead to a much broader skepticism than they may realize. For example, their concerns regarding the underdetermination of (metaphysical) theory by empirical evidence would, if generalized, lead to a very general skepticism which we should be hesitant to accept. Finally, I have concerns regarding the way that dismissivists such as Bennett and Willard characterize the dialectical patterns which they claim inform many metaphysical debates. Here’s what I mean by that. Bennett and Willard claim that partisans in many metaphysical disputes modify their positions to make them more similar to the positions endorsed by their competitors. This is supposed to be one of the main reasons we have so few grounds to decide between competing metaphysical positions: the competing metaphysical positions are, by design, not very far removed from one another. I don’t think that this is an accurate characterization of metaphysical debates in general, and I don’t think that it is an accurate characterization of the particular metaphysical debates cited by Bennett and Willard.