Given that whole-scenewhole-scene and gistgist perceptiongist perception (including peripheral, low-resolution, low-levellow-level, and nonconsciousnonconscious perceptionnonconscious perception) are central to our perceptual faculties and depend primarily on both neurological constraints and probabilisticprobabilistic processes instead of conceptualization, this chapter argues against a role for conceptsconcepts in (1) representation in artart (2) conceptualconceptual artconceptual art (3) perceptionperception theory. Coupled with these rejections is a rejection of the feedforwardfeedforward model (agreed upon by both the conceptualistsconceptualists and anti-conceptualistsanti-conceptualists), replaced by feedbackfeedback models that depend on loops and thus create dynamic systems. I argue that perception cannot be thought of as non-cognitivenon-cognitive, and in fact the non-sensical notion of non-cognitivecognitive is itself to be discarded as well as the putative divide between perception and cognitioncognition. Instead, gist and sensationsensation, which significantly accounts for the “what it’s likewhat it’s like” of experience, are counted as part of perceptual cognitionperceptual cognition—an embodiedembodied process. With a seamless relation to cognition, gist is a dynamic modeling of both the external world and internal affordancesaffordances. The brain processes the data from the repeated gist perceptual experiences, which in turn can become constituents of further processes. The divide is between sensingsensing and namingnaming, not perception and cognition. ArtArt, as paradigm, mimics the reiterative process of gist perceptionreiterative process of gist perception.