In most of the relevant constitutions, supermajority law covers institutional fields; this explains why some authors mention these norms as institutional acts. The vast majority of supermajority legislative fields in the various constitutions regulate the status, organization, and competences of crucial constitutional actors. This not only impacts the operation of these constitutional actors themselves, but also their relationships, which also influence the contours of the separation of powers. The chapter outlines three main relations where this effect might be plausible: the relationship between the government and the parliament; the relationship between the government and the constitutional court; and the relationship between the current government and future governments. Since the pro-government parliamentary majority should negotiate with the opposition from the enactment of supermajority laws, the weight of the opposition in the decision-making process would increase, and the excessive entanglement between the government and the parliament would disappear. As a consequence, the parliamentary opposition could impose more pressure on the government by blocking certain governmental initiatives or by exploiting the traditional tools of parliamentary control. The constitutional court would be granted an additional power if it could review compliance with the supermajority legislative process, as well as the coherence between the constitution, supermajority laws, and ordinary laws. However, this competence could easily involve the constitutional court in sharp political debates. The current government could significantly narrow the margin of movement for its successors, especially when a parliamentary supermajority stands behind the government. If a supermajority law is passed, future governments would have a difficult task in gaining the same parliamentary support for the amendment or the overrule of that law. The chapter details these three aspects of the separation of powers.