Various instruments serve the stability of constitutions, as too frequent amendments could significantly undermine the authority of the constitution on the top of the legal piramid. The required parliamentary consent or the approval of a referendum for constitutional amendments, the competence of the constitutional court to review substantial constitutional amendments, and the hierarchy between constitutional provisions, as well as the unamendable constitutional articles, could contribute to the development of constitutional rigidity. Analyzing further the legal rank of supermajority law, this legal instrument might be interpreted as a further stabilizing mechanism protecting the constitution. Several reform attempts could succeed with the amendments of supermajority laws, which would leave the constitution untouched. Nevertheless, this potential stabilizing impact would be significantly weakened by the detailed incompatibilities between supermajority law and other constitutional stabilizers on the one hand, and numerous uncertainties surrounding the legal rank and the scope of supermajority law on the other hand. For these reasons, supermajority might be considered a less effective tool for serving constitutional rigidity. The chapter also evaluates the special role of supermajority laws during transitory periods, especially during democratizations, when neither political actor could foresee the outcome of the forthcoming pluralist elections. For this reason, the inclusivity of the legislative process, underlined by the implementation of the supermajority requirement, serves the interests of all political parties, especially in those countries where regional or ethnic diversity might threaten the territorial integrity of the country. The chapter conceptualizes the relevance of the stabilizing role vested in supermajority law during these periods, which would be questioned once the bases of democratic constitutionalism have been crystallized.