Eco-Imagination cannot be limited to proposing new forms of human dwelling in the biosphere, for it requires a profound metamorphosis of thought itself, which must move from a self-centered to a relational, that is eco-logical dimension. The phenomenology of life, in the various expressions of the philosophers who have explored it, can help us understand how to lay the foundations for this project. One useful concept is the heteronomy of the living: the intentional character of life, which always postpones and presupposes a world. A constitutively copulative principle characterizes the living: it refers to a content present in the world, speaking of something that is present in the world, just as the gills of a fish refer back to the oxygen dissolved in the water. The phenomenology of life shows the non-autonomous and non-autopoietic character of the living, but not only in the thermodynamic sense, but also in its appearance. The world is not external to the entity that perceives it but is already inscribed in the entity and is called upon to reject its expressions. This shows us the relational character of predicates and the correlation of coherence between subject and world. Furthermore, it speaks to us of an ecological inherence that merits investigation with phenomenological metrics, with greater adherence than the classical mechanism of res extensa and the computability of phenomena.

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Eco-Imagination in the Phenomenology of Life

  • Roberto Marchesini

摘要

Eco-Imagination cannot be limited to proposing new forms of human dwelling in the biosphere, for it requires a profound metamorphosis of thought itself, which must move from a self-centered to a relational, that is eco-logical dimension. The phenomenology of life, in the various expressions of the philosophers who have explored it, can help us understand how to lay the foundations for this project. One useful concept is the heteronomy of the living: the intentional character of life, which always postpones and presupposes a world. A constitutively copulative principle characterizes the living: it refers to a content present in the world, speaking of something that is present in the world, just as the gills of a fish refer back to the oxygen dissolved in the water. The phenomenology of life shows the non-autonomous and non-autopoietic character of the living, but not only in the thermodynamic sense, but also in its appearance. The world is not external to the entity that perceives it but is already inscribed in the entity and is called upon to reject its expressions. This shows us the relational character of predicates and the correlation of coherence between subject and world. Furthermore, it speaks to us of an ecological inherence that merits investigation with phenomenological metrics, with greater adherence than the classical mechanism of res extensa and the computability of phenomena.