This phenomenological contribution centers on the concept of presentification (Vergegenwärtigung), particularly its evolution beginning with Edmund Husserl’s reflections in “Husserliana” XXIII: Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung [Phantasy, Image Consciousness, Memory]. In the first part, I introduce a model of presentification, derived from Husserl’s 1904/05 Göttingen analysis, which becomes problematic considering his later investigations on internal time-consciousness. These analyses redefine the relationship between presentation and presentification, a topic discussed at the end of this section. In the second part, I explore how Husserl’s assistant, Eugen Fink, developed this relationship further with his notion of depresentation (Entgegenwärtigung), a concept Husserl only began to address in the 1930s. The article also examines Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s recognition of the need to integrate both perspectives to account for the role of absence in advanced phenomenological description. In conclusion, I argue that both presentation and presentification—respectively, what is directly present and what is given as absent—are essential to experiencing the world ecologically.