Readers learn that Kant stated his ethics of survival unequivocally: “Misery, danger and torture are no casus necessitates for preserving my life,” he argued combatively contra Hume. “Necessity cannot cancel morality. If, then, I cannot preserve my life except by disgraceful conduct, … a higher duty here comes into play and commands me to sacrifice my life.” Unraveling Kant’s invitation to death, religion is conceived as having shaped the mind of a Prussian child, and a religious mind is conceived as having driven the mature philosopher’s reasoned ethics. Supporting information about Kant’s indoctrination into Lutheran Pietism is presented. Although Kant argued that “morality does not need religion,” while advancing the dominant rationalist tradition in philosophy, exploration of his religio-philosophic work shows that Kant held fast to the view that faith is the continuing development of moral consciousness, religion is ethical practice, and the martyred Jesus is the archetype of moral perfection toward which humans should aspire. Kant’s attempt to put moralistic Pietism to work in daily life reinforced his view that there is more value in an unwavering obedience to moral laws and a life lived honorably than in life itself. Given this inviolable invitation to death, the author infers that Kant would not have approved of the behavior of captives who survived a barbaric experience, but failed to live honorably by striving for moral perfection. Readers also learn that when Kant addressed the idea of moral perfection in practical terms, “setting-up the religion of good-life conduct,” he advanced the ethical ideal of imitatio Christi, arguing that it is a universal duty to elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection. Having focused on the religious indoctrination that took place during Kant’s childhood and adolescence, evidence from the neurosciences—including postnatal growth, hypertrophic development, neuroplasticity, behavior, etc.—is marshaled to provide insight into the physiology of childhood learning.