This chapter introduces Meillassoux’s concept of correlationism. He uses it to try to identify his philosophical opponents. Not only is Meillassoux’s use of the term reconstructed and criticised in what follows, but the concept of correlationism is also decisively developed further. To this end, I will make a distinction between an epochal concept of correlationism, a reasoning scheme and a systematic position. While the epochal concept is controversial in the debate and will not be examined in depth in the present work, the systematic position can be further crystallised, especially with regard to the previously obtained criticism of OSR and against the background of my map of the debate. I argue here in favour of separating correlationism from Meillassoux’s historical theses. The reasoning scheme will play a central role in my development of the systematic concept. My project in this chapter is to recast systematic correlationism as a tool of analysis. By the latter, I mean a systematic differentiation that is useful for analysing existing debates and sorting positions without reducing them to their status as (non)correlationist. In particular, this analytical tool is useful for better understanding anti-naturalist and anti-reductionist alternatives to anti-realism and realism in philosophy of science. This already articulates my thesis that the identification of correlationism and anti-realism often assumed in the research literature on Meillassoux is wrong: In my reading, correlationism is instead anti-reductionism and anti-dogmatism, which can be articulated in both realist and anti-realist stances. In order to create the context for my recasting of the concept and to distinguish between the epochal concept, reasoning scheme and systematic position, I will first discuss Meillassoux’s use of the term and its main problems (6.1). By discussing more nuanced criticisms, I argue in the next step that correlationism, with its central reasoning scheme, always opposes the strict subject-independence criterion and argues in favour of either specific epistemological or ontological propositions (6.2). Through my further interpretation and adaptation of the concept of correlationism, the points of criticism and ambiguities of Meillassoux’s original proposal can be removed. To show that it is not a straw man concept of Meillassoux’s opposition this is the most serious objection from the discussion I offer some case examples of correlationism (6.3): Stanford’s instrumentalist OSA, van Fraassen’s and Wray’s constructive empiricist ESA, Koch’s hermeneutic realism, and the radical interpretation of Sellars as a methodological naturalist realist. With the sharpened systematic correlationism that is developed in thisway, core views of scientific anti-realisms and correlationist realism are revealed and hidden dynamics of the realism-anti-realism debates become apparent, which can be subjected to the critique of ancestrality in the following chapter 7.

Correlationism

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发表日期：

2025年

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Jan Voosholz

摘要

This chapter introduces Meillassoux’s concept of correlationism. He uses it to try to identify his philosophical opponents. Not only is Meillassoux’s use of the term reconstructed and criticised in what follows, but the concept of correlationism is also decisively developed further. To this end, I will make a distinction between an epochal concept of correlationism, a reasoning scheme and a systematic position. While the epochal concept is controversial in the debate and will not be examined in depth in the present work, the systematic position can be further crystallised, especially with regard to the previously obtained criticism of OSR and against the background of my map of the debate. I argue here in favour of separating correlationism from Meillassoux’s historical theses. The reasoning scheme will play a central role in my development of the systematic concept. My project in this chapter is to recast systematic correlationism as a tool of analysis. By the latter, I mean a systematic differentiation that is useful for analysing existing debates and sorting positions without reducing them to their status as (non)correlationist. In particular, this analytical tool is useful for better understanding anti-naturalist and anti-reductionist alternatives to anti-realism and realism in philosophy of science. This already articulates my thesis that the identification of correlationism and anti-realism often assumed in the research literature on Meillassoux is wrong: In my reading, correlationism is instead anti-reductionism and anti-dogmatism, which can be articulated in both realist and anti-realist stances. In order to create the context for my recasting of the concept and to distinguish between the epochal concept, reasoning scheme and systematic position, I will first discuss Meillassoux’s use of the term and its main problems (6.1). By discussing more nuanced criticisms, I argue in the next step that correlationism, with its central reasoning scheme, always opposes the strict subject-independence criterion and argues in favour of either specific epistemological or ontological propositions (6.2). Through my further interpretation and adaptation of the concept of correlationism, the points of criticism and ambiguities of Meillassoux’s original proposal can be removed. To show that it is not a straw man concept of Meillassoux’s opposition this is the most serious objection from the discussion I offer some case examples of correlationism (6.3): Stanford’s instrumentalist OSA, van Fraassen’s and Wray’s constructive empiricist ESA, Koch’s hermeneutic realism, and the radical interpretation of Sellars as a methodological naturalist realist. With the sharpened systematic correlationism that is developed in thisway, core views of scientific anti-realisms and correlationist realism are revealed and hidden dynamics of the realism-anti-realism debates become apparent, which can be subjected to the critique of ancestrality in the following chapter 7.