This paper describes how fictionalism can be coupled with the quietism of Carnap, to create the position ‘Neo-Carnapian Fictionalism’. Carnap argues that it is not meaningful to question reality in an external sense to assess what really exists, rather it is only meaningful to talk in an internal sense within a framework about what exists according to the framework rules. I use the concept of fictions in place of frameworks to argue that we ought to treat much seemingly ontologically committing language as consisting in nothing more than a useful heuristic and as being fictional. This reframes ontological debates as being based around the practical advantages of utilizing a way of speaking in a fictionalist manner. The aim of this paper is thus to resurrect Carnap’s metaontology in the form of a deflated global fictionalism, that is divorced from the antirealism usually associated with fictionalism, where the fictionalism is based on quietism instead of antirealism.